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The difference of interests among shareholders that is dominated by controlling shareholders 
enlarges the possibility of deprivation towards the minority shareholders' rights. Therefore, a 
dividend is considered as a tool to reduce conflict of interests between both parties with the 
assurance of pro-rata distribution of the company's resources. Family and institutional ownerships 
have unique characteristics that are frequently found in Indonesian firms. Thus, this study intended 
to analyze the impact of controlling ownership owned by family and institution to dividend policy 
in nonfinancial firms listed in Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) during 2013-2017. The samples are 
chosen with the purposive sampling method resulting in 373 firms and 1.484 observations 
obtained. The data used in this study was secondary data from firms' annual and financial reports 
along with data extracted from Capital IQ. According to the regression results using the fixed-effect 
model, this study confirms the negative impact of controlling ownership owned by families towards 
firms' dividend policy. Whilst, controlling ownership owned by institutions shows that it has no 
significant impact on dividend policy. Otherwise, profitability, size, and leverages are proven to 
impact firms’ dividend policy. However, growth indicates no significant impact. 
 






Perbedaan kepentingan antara pemegang saham di tengah struktur kepemilikan yang didominasi 
oleh pemegang saham pengendali mampu memperbesar kemungkinan perampasan hak pemegang 
saham minoritas. Pembagian dividen dianggap dapat menjadi alat untuk meredakan konflik 
kepentingan antara kedua pihak dengan menjamin pendistribusian yang merata atas sumber daya 
perusahaan kepada seluruh pemegang saham. Kepemilikan keluarga dan institusi memiliki 
karakteristik yang unik dan sering ditemukan pada perusahaan di Indonesia. Penelitian ini bertujuan 
untuk menganalisis pengaruh kepemilikan saham pengendali oleh keluarga dan institusi terhadap 
kebijakan dividen perusahaan nonkeuangan di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) dalam periode 2013-2017. 
Pemilihan sampel dilakukan dengan metode purposive sampling dan didapatkan 373 perusahaan 
dengan 1.484 observasi. Data penelitian merupakan data sekunder yang berasal dari laporan 
tahunan dan laporan keuangan perusahaan serta basis data elektronik Capital IQ. Berdasarkan hasil 
regresi menggunakan model fixed effect, hasil penelitian ini membuktikan pengaruh negatif 
kepemilikan saham pengendali oleh keluarga terhadap kebijakan dividen perusahaan. Sedangkan, 
kepemilikan saham pengendali oleh institusi didapati tidak mempengaruhi kebijakan dividen. Selain 
itu, profitabilitas, ukuran dan tingkat hutang perusahaan terbukti mempengaruhi kebijakan dividen. 
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Namun, hasil penelitian ini menemukan pertumbuhan perusahaan tidak berpengaruh signifikan  
 
Kata Kunci: Kepemilikan Saham Pengendali; Identitas; Kepemilikan Keluarga; Kepemilikan Institusi; 





The controlling ownership of the public companies is found in Asian 
countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
2017). Companies in Indonesia usually start with a closed company established by 
a person or group of individuals. Even though it has developed into a public 
company, the share ownership structure tends to remain and dominate the 
company. This causes the controlling ownership structure in Indonesia to be found 
today (International Finance Corporation, 2018). The controlling ownership is 
characterized by a number of individuals or groups who own most of the shares 
and have a strong influence on the company (Dallas, 2004 in Warsini, 2013). Due 
to its strong influence, the controlling ownership structure as the main or 
concentrated owner can contribute to oversight of management actions which are 
often incompatible with the interests of shareholders regarding the management 
of the company. Thus, this can align conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
management. However, this condition can also lead to other differences in 
interests, namely differences in interests between majority and minority 
shareholders. Majority shareholders can potentially abuse their influence for 
personal gain that can rob minorities of their rights in the company. This will also 
be exacerbated by low investor protection and governance problems that often 
occur in civil law countries, such as in Indonesia (Wardhana & Tandelilin, 2018). 
One of the shareholders' rights is to get a return by their ownership portion. 
The nature of investors who avoid risk and uncertainty makes the distribution of 
corporate dividends more desirable than other forms of return (Gordon, 1963). 
Investors also viewed dividends as favorable considering that they do not always 
fully understand the intentions of company management (Baker, 2009). Besides, 
dividends also ensure an even distribution of returns to all shareholders and limit 
resources in the control of management or majority shareholders (Jensen, 1986; 
Ramli, 2010). This condition makes dividends an alternative to overcome agency 
problems that arise between shareholders. 
One form of majority share ownership that is often found in Indonesia is 
family ownership (OECD, 2017). The existence of a family that dominates 
ownership and control, views the company as a family legacy that must be 
preserved to be passed on to the next generation. Thus, family influence and 
company survival must be maintained (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Due to his high 
involvement in management, the potential for misuse of company resources is 
even greater. Besides, in countries with weak investor protection, indications of 
misuse of resources by families can also be reflected in the low dividends 
distributed (Mulyani, Singh & Mishra, 2016; Setiawan, Bandhi, Phua & Trinugroho, 
2016). However, this allegation is not limited to indications of misuse of resources. 
The risk-averse nature of the family can also make the family keep the cash they 
have so that it can reduce the company's dividend payments (Smirnova, Tabriztchi 
Santoso, Salim, Pranoto, & Adelina, Do Family and Institutional... 
17 
 
& Lange, 2015). 
Meanwhile, institutional shareholders engaged in the financial sector have a 
strong supervisory nature because of their expertise in evaluating financial 
performance, management quality, and corporate governance (Crane, Michenaud 
& Weston, 2016). Financial institutions are usually also intermediaries responsible 
for other parties' funds (Scholtens & Van Wensveen, 2000, in Ducassy & 
Montandrau, 2015). Thus, the supervisory role of institutional owners on 
management may affect the company's dividend policy and reduce agency conflicts 
(Chang, Kang & Li, 2016; Crane et al., 2016). However, with a high supervisory role, 
institutional owners can also directly reduce agency problems and reduce the 
urgency to pay dividends (Bushra & Mirza, 2015; Kautsar, 2019). 
The results of this research are quite diverse and the existence of 
controlling share ownership by families and institutions that is commonly found 
makes this study aim to further analyze the effect on dividend policy of public 
companies in Indonesia. Amid a country with weak investor protection and the 
presence of high majority shareholdings, the results of this study are expected to 
contribute to increasing regulator awareness of the importance of regulations 
regarding information disclosure and transparency of public companies, especially 
concerning the use of retained earnings and dividend policies. This study also 







An agency relationship is a contract between the principal as the owner and 
the agent, where the agent is hired to act on behalf of the principal and is given 
authority and authority regarding decision making in the company (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, there are often differences in interests between 
company owners and management or it can be classified as a type 1 agency 
problem. Then, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that the agency relationship in a 
company is not limited to owner and management only, especially when the 
company sells a portion of its ownership. to the other party. This will create 
differences in interests between the majority shareholder (the main owner of the 
company) and other parties or minority shareholders. 
The majority shareholder has the potential to use the company's resources 
for personal gain with the majority of control still owned as a result of reduced 
share ownership due to the presence of minority shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The existence of several new owners makes company profits must be 
distributed based on the portion of ownership. It can also make the majority 
shareholder reluctant to contribute more because it is considered that the return 
cannot be proportional to the effort made to the company (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This problem or hereinafter classified as a type 2 agency problem, makes 
minority shareholders want supervision of the behavior of the majority 
shareholder. 
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Bird in Hand Theory 
The Bird in Hand theory is a theory coined by Gordon (1963). This theory 
states that amidst market imperfections and information asymmetry, dividends 
are a relevant policy for increasing share prices and firm value. According to this 
theory, investors choose definite returns such as dividend payments due to the 
nature of investors who tend to avoid risk and uncertainty (Gordon, 1963). The 
higher the current dividend payment, the lower the risk level and the uncertainty 
of the company's cash flow. This causes investors to prefer dividends over other 
forms of return such as capital gains (Oktaviani & Desmintari, 2016). This is 
because capital gains are closely related to stock prices which always change over 
time. Therefore, returns in the form of dividends are better (bird in hand) than 
retained earnings (a bird in the bush), because the profits cannot be realized in the 
future (can fly away) (La Porta et al., 2000). 
 
Ownership Structure 
Ownership structures can be categorized into two types, namely distributed 
ownership and concentrated ownership. Distributed ownership is characterized by 
relatively small share ownership of the company by many shareholders so that 
control over the company is centered on professional management (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989; Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). Meanwhile, concentrated 
ownership is characterized by the existence of shareholders with controlling 
ownership in the company (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). In modern companies, 
the spread ownership structure in the company is expected to increase (Claessens 
et al., 2000). But in reality, there is still much-concentrated ownership due to weak 
protection of shareholder rights, especially in Asian countries (OECD, 2017). 
The majority shareholders in a concentrated ownership structure can incur 
costs to supervise and discipline managers, so that type 1 agency problems can be 
minimized (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In contrast to the majority shareholder, 
minority shareholders require heavier efforts to exercise supervision given the 
lower returns they get (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This can cause majority 
shareholders to abuse their influence and prioritize their interests which may not 
be in line with the interests of other shareholders in the company (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). One example of abuse of the influence of the majority shareholder is 
the transfer of company resources to its affiliates through related party 
transactions (Setiawan et al., 2016). This of course can harm minority 
shareholders. 
In addition to the large proportion of ownership, the majority share 
ownership structure can be grouped according to their identity (Aluchna et al., 
2019; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Different motivations and perspectives of 
shareholders can be reflected in the company's strategy in determining profit 
targets, dividends, capital structure, or growth rates. Therefore, this study 
discusses more deeply about the majority share ownership with family and 
institutional identities. 
 
Controlling Share Ownership by Family 
Family ownership is ownership by the founder and his family members of 
the company, either directly or through affiliated companies (Mulyani et al., 2016). 
Santoso, Salim, Pranoto, & Adelina, Do Family and Institutional... 
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Various studies define majority share ownership by a family that can effectively 
control a company if it owns at least 20% of its shares (Darmadi, 2016; Mulyani et 
al., 2016). According to Bertrand and Schoar (2006), the family as the founder of 
the company has a long-term commitment to maintaining and maintaining the 
survival of the company. The company is a family legacy that must be preserved 
and passed on to the next generations, hence the influence and control of the 
family over the company must be preserved. This commitment is a form of 
socioemotional wealth. In other words, social wealth is another goal in the form of 
values and obligations that the family must achieve in the company in addition to 
financial goals (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Family values in the company often 
make the family avoid decisions that risk-reducing its influence on the company. 
Also, family owners have the potential to engage in nepotism such as giving 
positions to family members in company management rather than recruiting 
professional managers who come from external parties (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; 
Duygun, Guney & Moin, 2018). 
From agency theory, the presence of family ownership in the company can 
create an alignment of interests between family shareholders and managers 
(alignment effect) (Mulyani et al., 2016). This is because family shareholders often 
have a dual role as owner and manager of the company (Thomsen & Pedersen, 
2000). However, the close relationship between family shareholders and 
management will also make it easier for family shareholders to access company 
resources (Al-Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016). This condition increases the potential 
for the majority shareholder of the family to act according to their interests 
(entrenchment effect) and creates agency problems with minority shareholders 
(Mulyani et al., 2016). 
 
Controlling Share Ownership by Institutional 
The controlling ownership owned by institutions is ownership by financial 
institutions such as banks, insurance companies, investments, and pension funds 
(Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Renneboog & Szilagy, 2015). Institutional ownership in a 
company can be said to be large or the majority of institutional shareholders own 
at least 5% of the company's shares (Lin & Fu, 2017). The supervisory role that 
institutional shareholders have is based on their ability to evaluate financial 
performance, management quality, and also corporate governance (Crane et al., 
2016). This is also motivated by financial success because financial institutions are 
intermediary agents for the real owners of funds. Thus, the objective of financial 
institutions will be more towards the liquidity and economic benefits of the 
companies they invest in (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Apart from being an 
intermediary agent, shareholders of financial institutions usually have a 
substantial percentage of equity ownership in the company. Thus, institutional 
investors do not have the same abilities as individual investors who can liquidate 
their ownership without affecting share prices (Musallam, Fauzi & Nagu, 2019). 
Therefore, institutional shareholders will tend to exercise the active supervision of 
the companies they invest in. 
However, institutions that own the controlling share ownership give them 
access to company personal information that may be misused for their gain and 
reduce the company's need for capital markets as an external surveillance system 
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(Velury & Jenkins, 2006; Al-Najjar, 2010). This condition can shift active 
surveillance to exploitation for personal gain or exploitation view (Velury & 
Jenkins, 2006). However, shareholders of financial institutions can also exercise 
passive supervision. This results in institutional shareholders not interfering in 
management and buying and selling shares only to get short-term profits, by 




Dividends are payments on company profits directly to shareholders for 
their contribution in financing the company's finances (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan, 
Lim & Tan, 2016; Reyna, 2017). Law Number 40 of 2007 regarding Limited 
Liability Companies, in article 71 paragraph 2 states that the dividends distributed 
are the entire net profit that has been reduced by the allowance for reserves unless 
otherwise stipulated in the GMS. The regulation also states that the condition for 
companies to pay dividends is to have positive retained earnings. Although 
important because it can indicate company performance and increase shareholder 
value, dividends also reduce internal funds (Sindhu, Hashmi & Ul Haq, 2016). By 
paying dividends, the company's opportunity to finance investment can be 
reduced. Conversely, a reduction in dividends paid can be viewed as a sign the 
company is experiencing financial difficulties. Therefore, dividend policy is quite 
crucial for the company (Reyna, 2017). 
From agency theory, dividends are often used as an alternative to alleviate 
the problem of differences of interest (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 
1982). In type 1 agencies, dividend payments can reduce resources under 
management control thereby reducing the potential for misuse of company 
resources. Also, dividend distribution can encourage companies to take external 
funding to fund their operations. At the same time, dividend payments will expose 
management to the oversight of the funder (Easterbrook, 1984). Besides, in the 
type 2 agency problem, dividend distribution can ensure an even distribution of 
cash flow for all shareholders and limit the control of large shareholders over 
company resources (Ramli, 2010). 
 
The Effect of Controlling Share Ownership by Family on Dividend Policy 
The high dividend payments of the company amidst the majority share 
ownership by the family can be explained in two ways (Isakov & Weisskopf, 2015). 
First, dividend payments are used to build a company's reputation when the 
company needs external funding. Then, the family also increases dividend 
payments to fund their consumption. The dividend payment is a way to diversify 
family assets that are embedded in the company and an effort to avoid selling 
shares that can reduce the family's influence on the company. 
However, various studies have also found that the controlling share 
ownership by families in companies tends to reduce dividend payments. Mulyani 
et al. (2016) stated that Indonesia is a civil law country, where the level of 
protection for shareholders is quite weak. Family owners also tend to choose 
company management based on family relationships. Subsequently, in Indonesia, 
controlling share owners often placed their family members in company’s top 
Santoso, Salim, Pranoto, & Adelina, Do Family and Institutional... 
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management position (Santos, Rindra, Hidayat & Adelina, 2020). This condition 
causes the family to easily accumulate cash under their power, making it 
vulnerable to misuse for personal purposes. As a result, dividend payments in 
family companies will be lower (Mulyani et al., 2016; Setia Atmaja, 2016; Setiawan 
et al., 2016). In addition, Smirnova et al. (2015) stated that families also tend to 
maintain their internal funds as a form of financial strategy. Families prefer to 
invest their retained earnings to maintain the sustainability and reputation of the 
company for future generations (Djebali & Belanes, 2015). This is related to 
another motivation of the family, namely maintaining its influence and maintaining 
the family heritage. 
To maintain the sustainability of the company, family owners tend to 
maintain adequate internal funds to avoid risks, such as the risk of bankruptcy or 
cash shortages. Then, these funds can also potentially be allocated to support the 
sustainability and reputation of the company in the future. However, strong family 
influence also has the potential to be misused for personal gain. Moreover, in a 
country with low investor protection such as Indonesia, the conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders is very likely to occur. This condition allows 
for the deprivation of the rights of minority shareholders by the majority of family 
shareholders in terms of profits distributed as dividends,  
Moreover, in the case of Indonesia, company with family ownerships tend 
to go with Asian values of family loyalties (Duygun, Guney & Moin, 2018). Under 
family control, managers can use investments in company and act to maximize the 
family’s wealth to the extend of detriment of the minority shareholders’ rights. 
Therefore, such companies tend to pay less dividends. Thus, the formulation of the 
hypothesis of this study is as follows. 
 
H1: The controlling share ownership by the family has a negative effect on 
dividend policy. 
 
The Effect of Controlling Share Ownership by Institution on Dividend Policy 
The ability of institutional owners to supervise company management to 
provide good performance and act in the interests of shareholders can reduce 
agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). The significant influence of 
institutional owners in a company can arise because of their responsibility as 
intermediaries for the actual owners of funds (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). This makes the majority shareholder of the 
institution exercises active supervision of the companies they invest in. Although 
institutions can also perform passive surveillance, Crane et al. (2016) argue that 
institutions also have a role in company supervision. Meanwhile in Indonesia, the 
active role of majority institutional shareholders is manifested by exercising their 
voting rights, providing advice on company strategy, and reminding the external 
risks of their investment companies that may occur (IFC, 2018). Seeing this, the 
presence of majority share ownership by institutions is seen as capable of 
influencing company policy, such as dividend policy (Al-Najjar & Belghitar, 2014). 
The ability of controlling institutional shareholders to improve the 
company's dividend policy is also supported by several studies such as Chang et al. 
(2016); Aluchna et al. (2019); Sindhu et al. (2016); Renneboog and Szilagyi (2015) 
EQUITY, Vol. 24, No.1, 2021, 15-34 
  22 
 
who found that institutional shareholders can reduce agency problems by using 
dividends as a monitoring tool. The presence of institutional shareholders in the 
company can change management attitudes with their expertise in the financial 
sector so that companies avoid opportunistic behavior and can protect minority 
shareholders with dividend payments (Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Djebali & Belanes, 
2015; Sindhu et al., 2016). However, some studies have found the opposite 
relationship. Namely, the strong role of supervision by institutional shareholders 
of the company can simultaneously reduce agency problems, thereby minimizing 
the need to pay dividends (Kautsar, 2019). 
In Indonesia, the existence of financial institutions is considered quite 
important in maintaining financial stability, monetary stability, and capital market 
development (IFC, 2018). Therefore, financial institutions are institutions that are 
strictly regulated by the government and are faced with certain prerequisites to 
mitigate the risk of failure of the institution. This can make financial institutions 
prudent in investing. Also, tight regulations can prevent financial institutions from 
doing things that only benefit themselves and encourage institutions to side with 
the interests of minority shareholders. Thus, the company's dividend payment can 
increase. This is supported by the research of Truong and Heaney (2007, in 
Aluchna et al., 2019) which found that among other majority shareholders, 
financial institutions have the least participation in the abuse of company policy 
through dividends. Therefore, financial institutions can mitigate agency conflicts 
and actively demand shareholder policies (Aluchna et al., 2019). This realizes the 
research hypothesis as follows. 
 
H2: The controlling share ownership by the institution has a positive effect 
        on dividend policy. 
 
Research Frameworks 
Picture 1 is the research framework used in this study based on the 
hypotheses. 
 
























Sample and Population 
The population of data used in the study was non-financial companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2013 to 2017. The research sample 
was taken by purposive sampling technique, where sampling was carried out 
based on certain criteria. Moreover, this research utilized the model of the 
unbalanced panel data. The list of samples can be described in the Table 1.  
Table 1. Research Samples 





Companies listed on the IDX in 2013-2017 558 2.790 
Companies engaged in the financial industry (100) (500) 
Companies that have negative retained earnings  (549) 
Companies with incomplete financial data  (257) 
Companies selected as samples 373 1.484 
Source: Processed data (2020) 
 
Operationalization of Variable 
Below is the table of operationalization of variables used in this study. It 
consists of one dependent variable, two independent variables, and four control 
variables.  
Table 2. Operationalization of Variable 
Variable Proxy Formula 
Dividend Policy (DIV) Dividend Yield 
DIV = Cash dividend per share paid in the 
following year / Price per share at the 
end of the current year 
Controlling Share 
Ownership by Family 
(FAM) 
Dummy 
FAM = dummy of family share ownership 
percentage 





INS = dummy of institutions share 
ownership 
percentage ≥5%. ‘1’ = Yes, ‘0’ = No. 
Size (SIZE) Total Asset SIZE = Log (Total Asset) 
Leverage (LEV) Debt to Asset LEV = Total Debt/Total Asset 
Profitability (ROA) Return on Asset ROA = Net Income/Total Asset 
Growth (GROWTH) 
Average company 
growth in 3 years 
GROWTH = (Sales (t) – Sales (t-1))/ Sales (t-
1)
 
Source: Processed data (2020) 
 In this study, measurement of share ownership percentage owned by 
family is counted by accumulating direct ownership by individual family or family-
affiliated company. According to La Porta at al. (1999), family with at least 20% of 
share ownership is capable of effectively controlling a company. If a company is 
founded by more than one family, each family has to possess at least 20% of the 
company’s share. This study limits the identification of family ownership to first 
and second generation. First generation includes the founder, the founder’s 
spouse, and the founder’s siblings. Further, second generation includes the 
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founder’s children and the founder’s children-in-law (Hiebl, 2015; Xu et al., 2015). 
Withal, the ownership by non-public company will also be investigated further. 
However, if ownership information regarding said company cannot be found, this 
study will consider it as a family company (Darmadi, 2016; Faccio & Lang, 2002; 
Maury, 2006). Ergo, if the company fulfil the criteria above, it is given a value of 1 
for the variable of FAM. Otherwise, it is given the value of 0. 
Subsequently, companies that are categorized into a financial institution are 
bank, insurance company, pension fund company, investment company and or 
other financial institutions. 5% or more share ownership by institutional company 
means that those institutional companies are the majority share owner (Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2003; Lin & Fu, 2017).  Moreover, Moin et al. (2019) showed that during 
the year of 1995-2014, the average percentage of institutional ownerships in 
Indonesia is relatively low. The smallest share ownership by institutional company 
is 0.37% and the largest one is 13%. Thusfar, based on those previous studies, the 
minimum value of 5% share ownership is relevant to show that an institution 
company is one of the controlling owners. Hence, if the company fulfil the criteria 
above, it is given a value of 1 for the variable of INST. Otherwise, it is given the 
value of 0. 
       
Data Analysis Method 
In analyzing the data, this study conducted a descriptive statistical test to 
describe the central tendency and the distribution of data. Furthermore, the 
analysis conducted the Chow test, Hausman test, and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test. Then, this study conducted a classical assumption test to fulfill the Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) assumption in the linear regression model. This test 
includes the normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation 
tests. Finally, this study conducted a hypothesis test consisting of the coefficient of 




To examine the effect of majority share ownership by families institutions 
on dividend policy, this study uses a multiple linear regression model as described 
in Formulae 1. 
 
Formula 1. Statistical Model 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ..........(1) 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows the results of descriptive statistics with a total of 1,484 
observations. The average company pays a cash dividend is 1.69% relative to its 
share price. The highest dividend yield value reached 33.02% in 2017. In addition, 
since the controlling share ownership by families (FAM) and institutions (INST) 
both use dummy variables, thus the minimum and maximum values are 0 and 1. 
FAM and INST show mean values of 0.73 and 0.26, respectively. This indicates that 
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from all research observations, there are 73% of companies whose ownership is 
majority-owned by families and only 26% of companies with institutions as a 
major owner. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Result 
Variable Mean Std. dev Min Max 
DIV 1,69 2,76 0,00 33,02 
FAM 0,73 0,44 0,00 1,00 
INST 0,26 0,44 0,00 1,00 
ROA 5,56 8,15 -52,54 71,60 
SIZE 28,79 1,55 23,56 33,33 
LEV 23,59 17,98 0,00 81,05 
GROWTH 47,51 603,02 -283,65 15.914,10 
Note: 
DIV= Dividend policy (%); FAM= Majority share ownership by family (dummy); INST= 
Majority share ownership by institution (dummy); ROA= Profitability (%); SIZE= Size 
(logarithm); LEV= Leverage (%); GROWTH= Growth (%). 
Source: processed data (2020) 
Furthermore, to fulfill the normality assumption, the study conducted the 
winsorize treatment to normalize the data for several variables including dividend 
policy (DIV), company profitability (ROA), and company growth (GROWTH). This 
impacts the adjustment of the descriptive statistics, especially related to data 
standard deviation. 
 
Pearson Correlation Test Result 
The Pearson correlation test results show that all coefficients do not exceed 
0.8 so that the research model is free from multicollinearity. The correlation test 
also shows that all independent variables have a significant correlation at a 1% 
level with the dependent variable. The correlation coefficient of controlling share 
ownership by family and institution variables, leverage, and company growth 
shows a negative direction indicating the potential to reduce company dividend 
payments. Meanwhile, the positive correlation coefficient between the profitability 
and company size variable on dividend policy shows its potential in increasing the 
level of company dividend payments. 
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Test Result 
 
DIV FAM INST ROA SIZE LEV GROWTH 
DIV 1,0000 
      
FAM -0,0859*** 1,0000 
     
INST -0,0652*** -0,0559*** 1,0000 
    
ROA 0,3628*** -0,1037*** -0,0990*** 1,0000 
   
SIZE 0,0881*** -0,1886*** -0,0675*** 0,0786*** 1,0000 
  
LEV -0,1676*** 0,1630*** 0,0036 -0,3620*** 0,2432*** 1,0000 
 
GROWTH -0,1015*** 0,0539*** 0,0292 0,1726*** 0,0104 0,0630*** 1,0000 
***= 1%-significance level; **= 5%-significance level; *= 10%-significance level; DIV= Dividend 
policy; FAM= Majority share ownership by family; INST= Majority share ownership by institution; 
ROA= Profitability; SIZE= Size; LEV= Leverage; GROWTH= Growth. 
Source: processed data (2020) 
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Regression Result 
Before running the regression test on the data, model selection test and 
classical assumptions test were utilized. There are four tests carried out following 
the fulfillment of classical assumption criteria. Moreover, based on the results of 
model selection test, this study uses the FE (Fixed-Effect) model because it is the 
most appropriate model compared to the other models. 
 
Table 5. Hypothesis Test Result 
Variable Coefficients P>|t| Result 
FAM -0,4694 0,042** Significantly Negative 
INST -0,2102 0,142 Insignificant 
ROA 0,0851 0,001*** Significantly Positive 
SIZE 0,9134 0,001*** Significantly Positive 
LEV -0,2161 0004*** Significantly Negative 
GROWTH -0,0039 0,134 Insignificant 




Prob > F 0,0009 
***= 1%-significance level; **= 5%-significance level; *= 10%-significance level; FAM= Majority 
share ownership by family; INST= Majority share ownership by institution; ROA= Profitability; 
SIZE= Size; LEV= Leverage; GROWTH= Growth. 
Source: processed data (2020) 
 
Based on Table 5, the regression results show a determination coefficient of 
8.12%. This number indicates that the independent variable of the study only 
explains the company's dividend policy by 8.12%. The study conducted 
hierarchical regression to determine the contributions of each independent 
variable. Subsequently, based on the hierarchical regression result on Table 6, the 
study found that the variable controlling share ownership by families and 
institutions only contributed 0.27% in explaining dividend policy. 












FAM -0,340* -0,437** -0,441** -0,454** -0,470** 
INST -0,264 -0,235 -0,229 -0,204 -0,210 
ROA  0,082*** 0,087*** 0,079*** 0,085*** 
SIZE   0,807*** 0,970*** 0,913*** 
LEV    -0,024*** -0,022*** 
GROWTH     0,004 
Cons 1,907*** 1,531*** -21,721*** -25,811*** -24,201*** 
R2 0,27% 5,55% 7,05% 7,94% 8,12% 
Prob > F 0,177 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 
***= 1%-significance level; **= 5%-significance level; *= 10%-significance level; FAM= Majority 
share ownership by family; INST= Majority share ownership by institution; ROA= Profitability; 
SIZE= Size; LEV= Leverage; GROWTH= Growth. 
Source: processed data (2020) 
 
Meanwhile, the variable that shows the largest contribution in explaining 
dividend policy is the financial performance factor, namely profitability. Although 
the variable controlling share ownership structure also influences dividend policy, 
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a greater contribution in explaining dividends is found in factors directly related to 
company performance. However, the F significance test result shows a Prob> F 
value of 0.0009 which indicates rejection of the null hypothesis (H0). Thus, the 
research model is suitable (fit) to explain the effect of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable simultaneously. 
 
Test Results 
The test results showed in Table 5 prove the effect of family ownership on 
company policy. The 5%-significance level can be due to the condition of 
companies in Indonesia that are majority-owned by families (IFC, 2018). The low 
dividend distribution in family controlling ownership can indicate two different 
things, namely the potential for the family to misuse company resources or the 
family shareholders to reinvest the profits earned. 
According to La Porta et al. (2000) and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), 
families as controlling owner can handle management and its decisions well. 
Moreover, the dual role of the family as owner and manager can ease their access 
to management, which is often found in companies in Indonesia. However, the size 
of the ownership and dual roles make family shareholders able to abuse company 
resources and maximize personal gain. Weak investor protection and low 
information disclosure can also increase the potential for misuse of resources by 
the majority shareholder (Mulyani et al., 2016). Therefore, a company where one 
of the majority shareholders is a family is considered able to tunnel or transfer 
cash flow, profits, or company assets to their families directly or through affiliated 
companies (Madhani, 2016; Setiawan et al., 2016). By doing this, company funds or 
resources that should be able to be distributed as dividends can decrease 
significantly (Mulyani et al., 2016; Setia Atmaja, 2016; Setiawan et al., 2016). Thus, 
minority shareholders in the company have the potential to suffer losses due to not 
receiving the rate of return they should have. 
In addition to the potential for misuse of resources, the low dividend payout 
in majority family ownership can also be caused by other family motivations 
besides the company's financial goals. Families tend to maintain their influence in 
the company and ensure the continuity of the family company to be passed on to 
the next generation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Vandemaele & Vancauteren, 2013). 
Given the family's goals, adequate internal funds are important and are considered 
to be able to prevent the company from going bankrupt and provide reserves for 
the company's operational needs (Duran, Lozano, & Yaman, 2016). The family also 
chooses to reinvest its cash flow and profits because it can support the company's 
future profits and maintain the sustainability and reputation of the family 
compared to increasing dividend payments (Djebali & Belanes, 2015). This 
practice can also lead to reduced dividends distributed by the company. 
This result is also supported by a mean difference test done in comparing 
the mean of two different classes of family ownership on dividend policy. Dividend 
payment differences between groups were also found to be significant at the 1% 
level. Based on table 9, it is found that, on average, companies without controlling 
ownership by the family distribute greater dividends than companies where one of 
the controlling ownership is family. Difference test' results on the company's 
performance factor also show why family majority-owned companies distribute 
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lower levels of dividends. Different test results show that companies without a 
family as the controlling ownership tend to have higher profitability and company 
size as well as lower levels of debt and company growth than companies whose 
ownership is dominated by family. The performance of a company whose 
controlling ownership are not owned by the family is more likely to be able to 
distribute dividends. The result of the different tests is as follows. 
 
Table 7. Difference Test of Family Ownership Group 
Variable 
Mean 
Pr (|T| > |t|) 
Companies without 




family as major 
shareholder (1.090 
observations) 
DIV 1,9000 1,4700 0,0016*** 
ROA 6,5873 4,9462 0,0005*** 
SIZE 29,2731 28,6129 0,0000*** 
LEV 18,7133 25,3469 0,0000*** 
GROWTH 12,04122 14,8903 0,0379** 
DIV= Dividend policy; FAM= Majority share ownership by family; INST= Majority share ownership 
by institution; ROA= Profitability; SIZE= Size; LEV= Leverage; GROWTH= Growth. 
Source: processed data (2020) 
 
In contrast to family ownership, the controlling share ownership by 
institutions is not proven to affect the company's dividend policy. This study found 
that only 26% of Indonesian companies are majority-owned by financial 
institutions. Thus, the supervisory role exercised by institutional shareholders 
doesn't likely influence companies' decisions. Furthermore, this confirms the 
findings of Sinarmayarani and Suwitho (2016) which state that institutional 
shareholders are found not to supervise management effectively. Additionally, this 
study also found that financial institutions in Indonesia have more potential to 
conduct passive supervision. This can be the reason for the lacking influence of 
institutions on dividend policy because of the nature of the passive supervision 
carried out, which usually means that institutions do not involve themselves in 
company management policies (Lin & Fu, 2017). 
Other factors that affect the company's dividend policy are the company's 
profitability, size, and level of debt. Profitability describes the level of company 
profit. The higher the profitability of a company, the easier it is to pay returns to 
shareholders in the form of dividends (Bushra & Mirza, 2015; Chang et al., 2016). 
Company size has also been shown to increase dividend payments due to the 
easier access for companies to make funding in the capital market. This causes a 
reduction in the level of the company's dependence on internal funds so that the 
company does not have obstacles to pay dividends (Kisman, 2013). Meanwhile, the 
level of debt has a negative effect on dividend policy because the company's 
internal fund adequacy will prioritize paying off its financial obligations first. 









This study aims to analyze the effect of controlling share ownership by 
families and institutions on company dividend policy. The results showed that the 
controlling share ownership by the family had an effect on the low dividends 
distributed. Companies with a majority of family ownership have the potential to 
misuse company resources for personal gain so that the resources that can be 
distributed as dividends are reduced. Furthermore, the weak protection of 
investors in Indonesia also increases the likelihood of deprivation of minority 
shareholders' rights. However, the reduction in dividend payments can also be due 
to the tendency of families to choose to reinvest their profits to support the 
sustainability of the company in the future. On the other hand, this study found 
that the controlling share ownership by institutions does not affect dividend 
policy. This lack of influence can be caused by the low presence of shareholders of 
financial institutions in public companies in Indonesia. Institutional shareholders 
in Indonesia can also have the potential to exercise passive supervision so that 
institutional shareholders become less involved in company management policies. 
Other factors such as profitability, size, and level of corporate debt also influence 
the company's dividend policy. However, company growth does not affect the 
company's dividend payments. 
This research is also inseparable from several limitations. First, 
identification of family ownership is carried out based on judgments that can lead 
to subjective assessment results. The existence of limited official information for 
some sample companies can affect the classification of companies with the family’s 
controlling share ownership. Then, this study cannot confirm the cause of the 
minimum dividend distribution in companies where one of the owners of the 
controlling share has a family identity. Research cannot distinguish whether 
families abuse resources or whether there is a preference for families who choose 
to reinvest their profits instead of paying dividends. This study also found that 
controlling share ownership by families and institutions made a small contribution 
in explaining dividends compared to company performance variables. Based on 
existing limitations, further research can add other factors that can strengthen 
indications of misuse of company resources, such as differences in control rights 
and cash-flow rights. Subsequent research can also add analysis related to other 
corporate governance and performance factors to further explain the company's 
dividend policy. Then, research can also be done specifically in financial 
companies. Furthermore, the next research can consider the addition of other 
dependent variables to see the difference in the influence between the controlling 
ownership with the identity of the family and financial institutions. 
Finally, this research is expected to be useful for several parties. For 
academics and further research, this research topic can be a reference that can be 
analyzed further. For investors, this research can provide information to consider 
investing decisions. Especially for investors who expect high dividend rates, 
investors can consider investing in companies whose ownership is not dominated 
by families. For regulators in Indonesia, this research can be used to evaluate the 
implementation of shareholder protection laws. Regulators can emphasize the 
disclosure of company information concerning dividend policies so that all 
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shareholders receive accountability information for funds invested in the 
company. Furthermore, for families that have controlling ownership, this study 
encourages the company to support shareholder protection by providing detailed 
information regarding dividend policies and plans for using company profits. Thus, 
all investors can obtain responsibility related to their investment. For financial 
institutions that have a controlling ownership, this study encourages active 
supervision to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders. For example, by 
asking the company to publish reports concerning fund allocations periodically. 
The active involvement of financial institutions in management is expected to 
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